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BORDER SEARCHES IN THE AGE OF 
TERRORISM 
Robert M. Bloom* 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate between individual freedom and the power of 
the executive—a contest hotly disputed throughout our nation’s 
history—rages during times of national crisis.  The terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, represent a crisis of 
unprecedented magnitude.  Reflecting on the likely effects of 
9/11 on the legal world, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor captured this sentiment in a speech at New York 
University Law School mere weeks after that infamous day: 
The trauma that our nation suffered will [alter] and has 
already altered our way of life, . . . and it will cause us to 
reexamine some of our laws pertaining to criminal 
surveillance, wiretapping, immigration, and so on . . . . As a 
result, we are likely to experience more restrictions on our 
personal freedom than has ever been the case in our country.1 
Justice O’Connor’s words are likely prophetic when 
considering the effect that terrorism and national security 
concerns will have on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  This 
article will focus on an area where terrorism and national 
 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  I wish to thank Beth Hanrahan, a 
student in the class of 2010 at Boston College Law School, for her valuable assistance. 
 1 JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 
206-07 (2007) (quoting a speech given by Justice O’Connor at New York University Law 
School on September 28, 2001). 
03_BLOOM 12/27/2008  9:03:19 PM 
296 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78.2 
security concerns are at their highest:  border searches. 
Despite any early, post-9/11 fears, such as those voiced by 
Justice O’Connor—that the judiciary would adopt its traditional 
posture of deference to the executive in times of national 
crisis2—the Supreme Court has in fact shown an unexpected 
willingness to review and restrict the power of the executive,3 at 
least when faced with due process concerns.  We refer to the 
string of cases concerning the status of those captured and 
detained by the United States during its “War on Terror;” cases 
in which the Court has, time and again, acted not in deference to 
the executive but out of fealty to one of “freedom’s first 
principles”: 4 individual rights. 
The group of cases decided on June 28, 2004, Rasul v. 
Bush,5 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld6 and Rumseld v. Padilla,7 were 
viewed by many as a harbinger of change.8  In Rasul, the 
petitioners, twelve Kuwaitis and two Australians captured 
abroad and being held in military custody at the United States 
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, brought suit in federal 
court in Washington, D.C., challenging the legality of their 
detention.9  The government defended on procedural grounds, 
 
 2 See David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and 
Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 238-39  Rudovsky notes: 
Historically, wars (both hot and cold) have placed great stress on constitutional 
rights, and these pressures have led the courts to countenance substantial 
limitations on liberty. The internment of Japanese-Americans during World 
War II, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the 
imprisonment of strikers and dissidents during World War I, and the 
McCarthy tactics of the Cold War were all justified in the name of war.  During 
each of these periods, the Supreme Court gave virtually complete deference to 
inflated Executive claims of imminent danger to the country. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 3 See Steven R. Shapiro, The Role of the Courts in the War Against Terrorism: A 
Preliminary Assessment, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103, 103 (2005). 
 4 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008). 
 5 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 6 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 7 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 8 See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 103 (“Whether process and transparency will be 
enough to preserve civil liberties in an age of terrorism remains to be seen.  It is, 
nonetheless, more than the courts have often demanded in the past during other periods 
of national crisis.  For that reason alone, it is an encouraging sign.”). 
 9 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-71. 
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arguing that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.10  
The Supreme Court decided in favor of the petitioners, holding 
that the federal habeas statute confers on the district courts 
jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges.11 
The legality of an American citizen’s detention as an enemy 
combatant at a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina, was at 
issue in Hamdi, where the Court held that, although Congress 
authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow 
circumstances alleged in this case, due process demands that a 
citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be 
given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for 
that detention before a neutral decision maker.12  The Court 
faced similar questions in Padilla, although it never reached the 
merits of the case, dismissing instead on procedural grounds.13 
In 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,14 the Court again found in 
favor of the petitioner, a Yemeni national captured in 
Afghanistan and held at Guantanamo Bay.15  In its decision, the 
Court held that the military commissions established by the 
President to try Guantanamo Bay detainees were not expressly 
authorized by any congressional act; that the military 
commission procedures violated the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and did not satisfy the Geneva Conventions.16  In the 
wake of the Hamdan decision, Congress enacted the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006,17 which specifically authorized the use 
of military commissions to try unlawful enemy combatants.18 
 
 10 Id. at 475. 
 11 Id. at 485. 
 12 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 508-39. 
 13 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (holding Padilla’s petition had been 
improperly filed in New York instead of South Carolina where he was being detained, 
the Court stated, “We confront two questions: First, did Padilla properly file his habeas 
petition in the Southern District of New York; and second, did the President possess 
authority to detain Padilla militarily.  We answer the threshold question in the negative 
and thus do not reach the second question presented.”). 
 14 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 15 Id. at 566-67. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 
10 U.S.C. §§ 948-50 (2006)). 
 18 This congressional action cleared the way for Hamdan’s war crimes trial by 
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This congressional action was the subject of Boumediene v. 
Bush19 in 2008.  At issue was Section Seven of the Act which 
denied the federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas actions 
such as the case at bar.20  The Court held, in part, that the 
petitioners—aliens designated as enemy combatants and held at 
Guantanamo Bay—were entitled to the habeas privilege.21  The 
Court held that Section Seven operated as an unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ because the government had not 
implemented an adequate and effective substitute review 
process, as required by the writ’s Suspension Clause.22  In other 
words, these Guantanamo Bay detainees had the constitutional 
right to challenge their detention in U.S. federal courts.23 
These decisions have been hailed as the Supreme Court’s 
“harsh rebuke” of the Bush Administration and its efforts to 
curtail individual rights in the name of national security.  These 
decisions have, some might say, tipped the scale in favor of 
 
military commission, which commenced on July 21, 2008.  His attempt to delay the trial, 
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, was unsuccessful.  The 
Boumediene decision was held to apply only to those detainees not yet facing any war 
crimes or criminal charges.  Thus Boumediene has not prevented the trial by military 
commission of those detainees already facing charges, such as Hamdan, from moving 
forward.  On August 6, 2008, a U.S. military jury found Hamdan guilty of providing 
material support for terrorism.  His attorneys will likely appeal. See William Glaberson, 
Panel Convicts bin Laden Driver in Split Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, August 7, 2008, at A1; see 
also Scott Shane & William Glaberson, Rulings Clear Military Trial of a Detainee, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2008, at A1; Jerry Markon, Detainee’s Trial in Military System Begins 
Today, WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 2008, at A03; see infra note 23 and accompanying 
text (for a brief discussion of the Boumediene decision and its impact on the Guantanamo 
Bay detainee cases generally). 
 19 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 20 Id. at 2242. 
 21 Id. at 2262. 
 22 Id. at 2274. 
 23 Id. at 2277.  The Boumediene decision opened the door for the more than 270 
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay to challenge their detention. See Robert Barnes, 
Justices Say Detainees Can Seek Release, WASHINGTON POST, June 13, 2008, at A01 
(summarizing the Boumediene decision and providing a brief history of the Guantanamo 
Bay detainee cases).  Those challenges have begun to move forward, with District Court 
Judge Thomas F. Hogan, who is overseeing a majority of the cases, urging expediency on 
all sides. See Matt Apuzzo, Judge to White House: Guantanamo is Top Priority, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 8, 2008. 
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personal liberties.24  However, these decisions reflect the Court’s 
inclination toward a preservation of due process rights alone.  
All of the plaintiffs were already in custody and seeking a 
hearing to challenge their detention.  The Fourth Amendment, 
on the other hand, goes to the issue of what the government can 
do to investigate terrorism.  Specifically, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, with reasonableness as its touchstone,25 allows 
the Court to weigh or balance concerns of terrorism and national 
security as part of its decision-making process.26  In this way, 
the Fourth Amendment provides the mechanism for considering 
terrorism concerns.  Thus, the question of reasonableness—
which balances the government interest (which surely includes 
the great destruction to life and property caused by terrorism) 
against the level of privacy intrusion on the individual—lends 
itself to Justice O’Connor’s prediction more readily than do 
questions of due process.  Our focus will be how terrorism and 
national security concerns affect Fourth Amendment 
determinations generally, as well as specifically in the border 
search area. 
 
 24 See, e.g., David Stout, Justices Rule Terror Suspects Can Appeal in Civilian 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/washington/12cnd-gitmo.html. 
 25 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (“The touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined 
‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's 
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))); see 
also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 
(1968).   
 26 The Fourth Amendment is made up of two clauses joined by the conjunction “and”: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
The first clause speaks to being secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and 
the second clause lays out the requirements for warrants including probable cause and 
specificity.  For much of the history of the Fourth Amendment, in order to give meaning 
to the vague term “unreasonable,” the Court read the two clauses together.  So a search, 
to be reasonable, would require a warrant with justification and specificity, otherwise it 
would be per se unreasonable. However, for the last thirty years, the Court has opted to 
analyze reasonableness on its own—warrants and justification, therefore, are but a 
factor in determining reasonableness.  The balancing test is reflective of this approach. 
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This article will first explore the history of border searches.  
It will look to the reorganization of the border enforcement 
apparatus resulting from 9/11 as well as the intersection of the 
Fourth Amendment and border searches generally.  Then, it will 
analyze the Supreme Court’s last statement on border searches 
in the Flores-Montano27 decision, including what impact this 
decision has had on the lower courts.  Finally, the article  will 
focus on Fourth Amendment cases involving terrorism concerns 
after 9/11, as a means of drawing some conclusions about the 
effect the emerging emphasis on terrorism and national security 
concerns will likely have on border searches in this post-9/11 
world. 
I. HISTORY 
A. Legislative 
  The government has restructured its border operation 
since 9/11.  The United States Border Patrol (USBP), founded in 
1924, has had many responsibilities during its history.  It has 
often reflected changing societal concerns.  As a result of 9/11 
and the ensuing Homeland Security Act of 2002,28 the USBP 
was moved from the dissolved Immigration and Naturalization 
Service to within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
In this way, the Border Patrol and the inspection division of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service were for the first time 
brought under a single umbrella: the newly-created Department 
of Homeland Security.  USBP is now a segment of Customs and 
Border Protection under the directorate of Border and 
Transportation Security, which reports directly to the director of 
Homeland Security.  Part of the primary mission of the DHS is 
to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States” and 
“reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism.”29  In 
recent testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Ronald 
 
 27 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
 28 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). 
 29 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2004). 
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Colburn, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol, said “our main 
function is to prevent the illegal entry of terrorists, criminals, 
illegal aliens, illegal narcotics, contraband as well as smugglers 
who operate between ports of entry.”30  It is interesting to note 
that the first topic he mentioned was terrorists. 
Greater cooperation between agencies has also resulted 
since 9/11.  The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) has been 
established so that the federal government can better process 
terrorist informants.  The FBI and the DHS created watch lists 
of informants with the TSC acting as a central repository of such 
information.  The TSC and the Terrorists Screening Database 
(TSDB) are administered by the FBI and include all individuals 
believed to have any degree of terrorism nexus.  The TSDB 
included more than 200,000 names with each person being 
assigned a category of terrorist threat.31 
After being consolidated within the DHS, the border 
agencies, which were renamed the U.S. Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection, continued to be responsible for enforcing U.S. 
immigration laws, administering U.S. customs laws, and 
“securing the borders.”32  They were also given a new principal 
responsibility: “Preventing the entry of terrorists and the 
instruments of terrorism into the United States.”33  During the 
last decade manpower has nearly tripled.  The number of border 
patrol agents has grown from approximately 5,900 in 1996 to 
approximately 18,000 today.34  It should be pointed out that not 
only has there been greater scrutiny at the border, but there has 
been a tightening of the requirements to obtain a visa.35  This 
 
 30 Border Security Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 2007 WL 2802236 (statement of 
Ronald Colburn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Border Patrol). 
 31 See Rahman v. Chertoff, 244 F.R.D. 443, 446 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 32 6 U.S.C. § 542 (2002) (codifying the Reorganization Plan Modification for the 
Department of Homeland Security, H. Doc. 108-32 (2003)). 
 33 6 U.S.C. § 202(1) (2002). 
 34 GAO, Border Patrol: Costs and Challenges Related to Training New Agents: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mgmt., Investigations, & Oversight of the H. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec., GAO-07-997T (2007) (statement of Richard M. Stana, Dir., Homeland 
Sec. & Justice Issues). 
 35 See James Glanz, Study Warns of Lack of Scientists as Visa Applications Drop, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A28. 
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increase in personnel and restructuring demonstrates the 
heightened scrutiny at the border in light of the “War on 
Terror.” 
B. Courts 
As early as 1886, the Supreme Court pointed out the 
importance of border searches.36  The court in Boyd v. United 
States indicated that Congress had passed a statute37 
authorizing the seizure38 of non-customed goods two months 
before it passed the Fourth Amendment.  “[C]ustoms officials 
[had] ‘full power and authority’ to enter and search ‘any ship or 
vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, 
wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.’”39  
Therefore, it was evident the drafters of the Constitution did not 
believe searches and seizures at the border were unreasonable.40  
This was reiterated in 1925 in Carroll v. United States.41  This 
case involved the smuggling of alcohol during prohibition.  The 
Court, in dicta, indicated that the rationale for the per se 
reasonableness of searches and seizures at the border went 
beyond merely collection of duty but was also derived from 
concerns of national security.  The Court noted that “travelers 
may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary 
because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one 
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, 
and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought 
in.”42 
Thus there is recognition that the nation can control whom 
and what may enter the country.43  From its historical roots of 
preventing the entry of uncustomed goods, search and seizure at 
the border has extended to protection from the entry of 
 
 36 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S 616 (1886). 
 37 Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Cong. ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43. 
 38 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). 
 39 Id. (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Cong. ch. 5. § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43). 
 40 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. 
 41 267 U.S. 132, 147-50 (1925). 
 42 Id. at 154. 
 43 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620. 
03_BLOOM 12/27/2008  9:03:19 PM 
2008] BORDER SEARCHES 303 
undesirable people, drug interdiction, preventing the import of 
dangerous material, and, since 9/11, to working on preventing 
terrorists and instruments of terrorism from crossing the 
border.44 
Moreover, there has been a long-standing recognition that 
border searches are per se reasonable.  Historically, border 
searches have been allowed without the two primary protections 
of the Fourth Amendment: probable cause and the need for a 
warrant.  Border search represents one of the original 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  
Attempts to utilize the border search exception at places other 
than the border have not been successful.45 
As time has passed, border searches have merged into the 
evolving administrative or regulatory search doctrine.  These 
searches have one common element: they are not being done for 
the normal law enforcement goal of finding criminals but for 
goals unrelated to criminal investigation.  The Fourth 
Amendment approach to these searches was introduced in 
Camara v. Municipal Court.46  In this case involving inspections 
for housing code violations, the Court acknowledged that the 
traditional requirement of probable cause and resulting warrant 
for Fourth Amendment activity would not work; there was no 
individualized suspicion because health inspection would 
usually involve large areas of concern, not individual houses.  As 
such, the Court turned to the reasonableness clause of the 
 
 44 See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez 
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
 45 These searches at locations other than the border have required some 
justification. See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 (“Except at the border and its 
functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware 
of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that 
reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the 
country.”); Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-73 (“Whatever the permissible scope of 
intrusiveness of a routine border search might be, searches of this kind may in certain 
circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but at its functional equivalents as 
well. . . . But the search of the petitioner’s automobile by a roving patrol, on a California 
road that lies at all points at least 20 miles north of the Mexican border, was of a wholly 
different sort.  In the absence of probable cause or consent, that search violated the 
petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 46 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
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Fourth Amendment and devised a balancing test.  The Court 
balanced the need to search—the government interest—with the 
scope of the intrusion resulting from the search, saying that 
“there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other 
than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which 
the search entails.”47  In the health inspection search, so as to 
limit the discretion of the inspector which might result in a 
greater intrusion, a standardized approach involving neutral 
criteria was required.  Thus, on one hand, the Court considers 
the degree to which the seizure or search intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy, and, on the other hand, it considers the 
degree to which the seizure or search promotes the government 
interest.  In analyzing reasonableness, the Court looks to “the 
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree 
to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the 
severity of the interference with individual liberty.”48 
Reasonableness of searches has become the touchstone of Fourth 
Amendment analysis.49 
Border searches coupled with terrorism concerns also bring 
to mind a category of administrative searches sometimes 
referred to as “special needs” searches.  Justice Blackmun, who 
coined the phrase in a high school search case, described special 
needs as those “beyond the normal need for law enforcement, 
mak[ing] the warrant and probable cause requirement 
impracticable.”50 He found the school setting to represent 
exceptional circumstances.  Also included in this category of 
special needs are the search of a government employee’s office 
for professional misconduct,51 the search of a probationer’s 
home,52  or the suspicionless search of probationers.53 
As we will see, border searches have fallen comfortably 
 
 47 Id. at 536-37. 
 48 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 
51 (1979)). 
 49 See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997). 
 50 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 51 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 52 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
 53 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
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within this balancing framework.  The important government 
interest side of balancing with regard to reasonableness has 
been the basis of border searches, as the Court indicated in 
United States v. Ramsey.54 “[S]earches made at the border, 
pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect 
itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing 
into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that 
they occur at the border.”55 On the intrusion side of the balance, 
since everyone is subject to such searches (the old adage “misery 
loves company”), there is less of an intrusion.56 Thus ordinary or 
routine searches at the border can be made without a warrant or 
individual suspicion.  In determining what is ordinary or 
routine, one must consider the objective of the border search: the 
vital national interest to protect against persons and things 
coming into our country.  Given this interest, then, intrusions, 
including searches of outer clothing, luggage, shoes, pockets, 
contents of mail, wallets, and purses, are routine and require no 
justification.57 When the scope of the intrusion increases to the 
extent that the border search is no longer routine, then some 
justification might be required. 
This increasing justification reasoning is reminiscent of the 
approach in Terry v. Ohio58 and elaborated on in United States v. 
Sharpe.59 Terry, a case involving the so-called stop-and-frisk 
 
 54 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Justice Rehnquist in dissent opined: 
Because motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be 
“frightened” or “annoyed” when stopped en masse, a highway patrolman needs 
neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion to stop all motorists on a 
particular thoroughfare, but he cannot without articulable suspicion stop less 
than all motorists.  The Court thus elevates the adage “misery loves 
company’”to a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Id. 
 57 See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (seizure of 
photographs); United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2002) (search of luggage and 
briefcase); United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1979) (examination of 
papers found in pockets); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967) 
(search of purse). 
 58 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 59 470 U.S. 675 (1985). 
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doctrine, allowed for a search based upon less justification than 
probable cause because the intrusion was less than a full-scale 
arrest.60  As the intrusion increases so too must the justification.  
In Terry, to determine whether the search was unreasonable, 
the Court devised a two-step analysis.  First, the Court asked, 
was the Fourth Amendment activity justified at its inception?61 
Next, the Court found it necessary to analyze the scope of the 
search: the government’s conduct “must be ‘strictly tied to and 
justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible.”62 To state it differently, the Court will take into 
account the purpose of the stop and the time and manner needed 
to effectuate that purpose.  In considering the scope, the Court 
must examine whether law enforcement officers diligently 
pursued their purpose: 
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be 
justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to 
examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of 
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to 
detain the defendant.63 
Again, as the justification increases, so can the scope of the 
search.  The scope includes both the manner and length of 
detention.64 
In Illinois v. Caballes,65 for example, the respondent was 
stopped for speeding on an interstate highway.66  As the first 
trooper on the scene was writing a warning ticket, a second 
trooper arrived with his drug-detection dog.67  The dog signaled 
the presence of drugs in the trunk of the respondent’s car, and 
 
 60 392 U.S. at 25-26. 
 61 Id. at 20. 
 62 Id. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., 
concurring)). 
 63 Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. 
 64 See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-100 (2005); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975). 
 65 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 66 Id. at 406. 
 67 Id. 
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the officers searched the contents of the trunk, found marijuana, 
and immediately arrested the respondent.68  The question on 
which the Supreme Court granted certiorari was “[w]hether the 
Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a 
legitimate traffic stop.”69 Although the Court recognized that a 
“seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a 
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is 
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that 
mission,” 70 the facts did not support such a finding in Caballes.  
The duration of the stop, the Court concluded, was “entirely 
justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries 
incident to such a stop.”71  It should be pointed out that the dog 
was readily available and additional time was not necessary to 
secure the presence of the dog.72  In the Court’s view, conducting 
a dog sniff would not change the character of the stop unless the 
sniff itself infringed upon the respondent’s constitutionally 
protected interest in privacy.73  Since there is no Fourth 
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in a dog sniff, the 
Court found no such constitutionally protected privacy interest 
here,74 and therefore the sniff was not a search subject to the 
Fourth Amendment.75 
 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 407. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 408. 
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (“We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed 
‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of 
contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”). 
 75 Id. at 408 (“Official conduct that does not ‘compromise any legitimate interest in 
privacy’ is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)); see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (holding, 
in part, that there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, and thus no further justification required for officers’ questioning of 
respondent about her immigration status while executing a search warrant, because 
respondent’s initial detention was lawful and her lawful detention was not prolonged by 
the questioning). 
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United States v. Montoya de Hernandez76 provides a useful 
framework for a Terry analysis in the border area.  In this case, 
a woman entering the country from Bogota, Columbia, was 
suspected of being a so-called “balloon swallower.”77  She was 
held for almost sixteen hours before customs officials sought a 
court order for an x-ray, pregnancy test, and rectal examination, 
as she refused to use the toilet.  During this period, she had not 
defecated, urinated, or had food or drink.78  Ultimately, she was 
taken to a hospital where a physician removed a foreign 
substance from her rectum.79  “[O]ver the next four days[, the 
woman] passed 88 balloons containing a total of 528 grams of 80 
percent pure cocaine hydrochloride.”80  To determine the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness of the intrusion, the Court balanced 
the intrusion with the legitimate governmental interest. 
In looking at the government interest, the court recognized 
the government’s broad power to conduct border searches to 
protect the nation by stopping and examining persons coming 
into the country.81 “At the border, customs officials have more 
than merely an investigative law enforcement role.  They are 
also charged, along with immigration officials, with protecting 
this Nation from entrants who may bring anything harmful into 
this country, whether that be communicable diseases, narcotics, 
or explosives.”82 This power is “qualitatively different at the 
international border than in the interior.”83 Because of this, the 
balance favors the government at the border.  In this case, the 
Court highlighted the border concerns by pointing out the 
“veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by 
smuggling of illicit narcotics.”84 
On the intrusion side of the equation, the Court evaluated 
 
 76 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
 77 Id. at 534 (explaining that a balloon swallower is one who hides drugs in their 
alimentary canal). 
 78 Id. at 535. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 536. 
 81 Id. at 538. 
 82 Id. at 544. 
 83 Id. at 538. 
 84 Id. 
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the sixteen-hour detention and the ultimate examination of the 
rectum.  The court of appeals evaluating the intrusion 
questioned the “humanity” of holding someone “until her bowels 
moved, knowing that she would suffer ‘many hours of 
humiliating discomfort.’”85  The Supreme Court, although 
finding the “intrusion beyond [a] routine” border search, opted 
for a lesser “reasonable suspicion” standard as opposed to a 
higher “clear indication” standard.86  Finding that the 
government did have a “particularized and objective basis” 87 to 
meet the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court turned to the 
scope to ask if it was reasonably related to the justification.  The 
Court expressed reluctance to get into an after-the-fact 
evaluation, and stated that the mere fact that there were less 
intrusive ways to accomplish the objective would not necessarily 
render the search unreasonable.88  The Court rejected any time 
limits and instead opted for a common sense approach to 
evaluate the intrusion.89 
Justice Brennan in dissent, upset about the length of 
detention and methods used in this case, thought that the 
justification should have been presented to a judicial officer, 
otherwise a great deal of authority is allocated to low-ranking 
officials.  He argued: 
Something has gone fundamentally awry in our constitutional 
jurisprudence when a neutral and detached magistrate’s 
authorization is required before the authorities may inspect 
‘the plumbing, heating, ventilation, gas, and electrical systems’ 
in a person’s home, investigate the back rooms of his 
workplace, or poke through the charred remains of his gutted 
garage, but not before they may hold him in indefinite 
involuntary isolation at the Nation’s border to investigate 
whether he might be engaged in criminal wrongdoing.  No less 
than those who conduct administrative searches, those charged 
with investigative duties at the border “should not be the sole 
 
 85 Id. at 536. 
 86 Id. at 541. 
 87 Id. at 541-42 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
 88 Id. at 542. 
 89 See id. at 543. 
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judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in 
pursuing their tasks,” because “unreviewed executive 
discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain 
incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of 
privacy.”90 
Searches of persons such as that which occurred in Montoya 
de Hernandez are regarded as non-routine.91 These searches 
require justification—usually reasonable suspicion.  It should be 
pointed out that reasonable suspicion was all that was required 
in the very intrusive search in Montoya de Hernandez.  So a 
border search which falls under the rubric of “routine” requires 
no further justification other than the fact that it occurs at the 
border.  However, when the search involves greater intrusion, it 
is classified as “non-routine,” and some additional level of 
justification is required.92 
The last case involving border searches decided by the 
 
 90 Id. at 555-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. 
U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)). 
 91 See id. at 541-42 (majority opinion); see also United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 
421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970)). 
 92 The routine versus non-routine distinction usually focuses on the physical aspects 
of the search, such as disrobing, exposing intimate body parts, forced intrusions causing 
pain, and physical contact. See, e.g., United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1988); 
see also Christine A. Coletta, Note, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the 
Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971, 997-98 (2007). 
  In Bradley v. United States, the search included a pat down of Bradley’s dress by a 
female inspector who then used her fingers to push on Bradley’s breasts and inner and 
outer labia.  299 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 2002).  This pat down was regarded as routine 
even though it included patting of the clothing outside sensitive areas.  Id. at 204.  Non-
routine searches were regarded as strip searches, body cavity searches and pat downs 
that involved fondling or penetration.  Id. at 205. 
  The category of routine border searches includes: pat down searches for weapons 
or contraband, the removal of shoes and outer garments, the emptying of pockets, purses 
and wallets, the use of drug sniffing dogs, the cutting of a spare tire, and x-ray searches 
of inanimate objects. See United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 383 F.3d 1093, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 
2004) (cutting of spare tire); United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294-95 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(canine sniff); United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (pat down of 
defendant); United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981) (pat down of 
defendant). 
  X-ray searches have been considered no more intrusive than a strip search and a 
more dignified alternative to a body-cavity search. See United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 
F.2d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 1984). 
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Supreme Court was United States v. Flores-Montano.93 In 
Flores-Montano, the Court was faced with the question of 
whether the dismantling and search of a full gas tank needed 
additional justification.94  After an initial inspection of a car, it 
was sent to a secondary inspection station.95  A customs 
inspector tapped the gas tank and, when it sounded solid, 
requested a mechanic to remove the tank.96  A mechanic arrived 
within twenty to thirty minutes and then spent between fifteen 
and twenty-five minutes disconnecting the gas tank from the 
car.97  The inspector hammered off Bondo (a putty-like 
substance used to seal openings) and found thirty-seven 
kilograms of marijuana blocks.98 
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Montoya de Hernandez 
routine/non-routine distinction in its analysis of the search, 
finding that such searches were non-routine and therefore 
required reasonable suspicion.99  The court of appeals also relied 
on United States v. Molina-Tarazon,100 one of its previous 
decisions.  It is interesting to note the reasoning of the court in 
Molina-Tarazon as it specifically dealt with the search of 
inanimate objects as opposed to a body search.  In determining 
that the search of the gas tank was non-routine, the court looked 
at three contributing factors: the force used to remove and 
disassemble the gas tank, the risk of harm involved in the 
procedure, and the diminished sense of security experienced by 
the individual whose vehicle was searched in such a manner.101 
When Flores-Montano was before the Supreme Court, the 
government chose not to argue the need for any justification to 
disassemble and search the gas tank even though there was 
 
 93 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
 94 See id. at 150. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 151. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id. at 150-52. 
 100 279 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 101 Id. at 713-14. 
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some justification (the tank “sounded solid”).102  In this way, the 
government deliberately raised the issue of what constitutes 
routine or non-routine.  Keep in mind, a non-routine search 
would require some justification.  However, the Supreme Court 
rejected the lower court’s use of the Montoya de Hernandez 
routine/non-routine distinction when dealing with a search of 
property as opposed to an individual.  The Court, in 
distinguishing privacy concerns of persons from those of 
property and, in particular, automobiles, said that “complex 
balancing tests to determine what is a ‘routine’ search of a 
vehicle, as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person, have 
no place in border searches of vehicles.”103 In this way, the Court 
seemed to discount the necessity of determining when a non-
bodily search, such as an automobile search, would ever be 
characterized as non-routine; thus the routine/non-routine 
distinction appears inapplicable to property border searches.  
The Court said “[i]t is difficult to imagine how the search of a 
gas tank, which should be solely a repository for fuel, could be 
more of an invasion of privacy than the search of the 
automobile’s passenger compartment.”104  In responding to the 
danger issue raised in Molina-Tarazon, the Court pointed out 
that gas tank searches could be conducted without damaging the 
vehicle, the process was easily reversible, and there was no 
evidence of any accidents resulting from disassembly.105  Since 
the facts did not raise the issue of drilling or other permanent 
destruction of the vehicle, the court refused to consider it.106  
Even though a motorist’s interest is “not insignificant” when the 
government removes, disassembles and reassembles a gas tank, 
it is outweighed by “the Government’s interest of preventing the 
entry of unwanted persons and effects[, which] is at its zenith at 
the . . . border.”107 Persons crossing the border have a reduced 
 
 102 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 151. 
 103 Id. at 152. 
 104 Id. at 154. 
 105 Id. at 154-56. 
 106 See id. 
 107 Id. at 152. 
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expectation of privacy.108 Balancing the strong governmental 
interests and lesser privacy expectations, most searches at the 
border fall within a routine category.  The Court has left a 
narrow opening if the process would have destroyed the 
property.109  Within this possible exception, it appears as though 
the Court would only consider non-routine searches as those 
involving body searches, as demonstrated by the facts of 
Montoya de Hernandez, which included an intrusive body cavity 
search and x-ray examination, as well as a time of detention of 
over sixteen hours. 
A question unresolved by Flores-Montano involves whether 
laptop computers should be regarded as property similar to an 
automobile.  Laptop computers store a great deal of personal 
effects, including e-mails, photos, and financial material, often 
spanning many years: 
While not physically intrusive as in the case of a strip or body 
cavity search, the search of one’s private and valuable personal 
information stored on a hard drive or other electronic storage 
device can be just as much, if not more, of an intrusion into the 
dignity and privacy interests of a person.  This is because 
electronic storage devices function as an extension of our own 
memory.  They are capable of storing our thoughts, ranging 
from the most whimsical to the most profound.110 
Such capabilities bring to mind the sentiment expressed by 
the dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States111 by Justice 
Brandeis, recognizing the importance of one’s innermost 
thoughts: 
The makers of our Constitution . . . recognized the significance 
of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.  
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.  They 
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
 
 108 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). 
 109 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154-56. 
 110 United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 523 
F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 111 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as 
against the government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.112 
Nevertheless in cases after Flores-Montano, circuits have 
treated the computer as property not requiring any additional 
justification for searches.  For example, the Fourth Circuit in 
United States v. Ickes,113 recognizing the government’s broad 
authority to conduct border searches, refused to carve out a First 
Amendment exception for computers at the border.114  In 
expressing concern for protecting the sovereign from terrorists, 
the court stated: “Particularly in today’s world, national security 
interests may require uncovering terrorist communications, 
which are inherently ‘expressive.’”115 The court was also 
reluctant to create a standard which would distract customs 
officials from “policing our borders and protecting our 
country.”116 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit in Arnold,117 overturning a 
lower court decision, interpreted Flores-Montano as not 
distinguishing automobiles from other property.  According to 
the court, because the computer was property, it did not 
implicate the same concerns as the search of a person.118 The 
 
 112 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 113 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 114 Id. at 506. 
 115 Id.  Ickes argued that Ramsey was willing to afford greater protection to 
expressive material.  The Fourth Circuit pointed out that Ramsey did not draw such a 
line. Ramsey found it “unnecessary to consider the constitutional reach of the First 
Amendment in this area in the absence of existing statutory and regulatory protection” 
Id. at 507 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 620, 624 (1977)). 
 116 Id. at 506. 
 117 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 118 See id. at 945-46; see also United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 
(W.D. Tex. 2008) (“The Defendant would like the Court to believe that the search of his 
computer was unauthorized because he maintains a higher degree of privacy in his 
computer, due to the personal nature of information contained therein.  The Defendant 
claims that any search of a computer is akin to a bodily search of a person and should be 
categorized as a non-routine search requiring a finding of reasonable suspicion in order 
to conduct such a search.  The Defendant would have this Court impute the same level of 
privacy and dignity afforded to the sovereignty of a person's being to an inanimate object 
like a computer.  The Court finds this argument without merit.  Relying on the Supreme 
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court further cited Flores-Montano for the proposition that the 
distinction between routine and non-routine was simply 
inapplicable when dealing with property.119 In this decision, 
there was no analysis of the intrusiveness of computer searches.  
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has elaborated on the 
search of computers, allowing for the taking, retaining, copying, 
and sharing of the information on these computers.  These 
computers may be retained for a reasonable time.120  The policy 
emphasizes that all this may be done without any individualized 
suspicion.121 
In United States v. Ramsey,122 a case involving a border 
search of an envelope, Justice Rehnquist indicated that a search 
of the envelope for contraband was different than reading 
correspondence in the envelope.123  Arguably, to actually read 
the correspondence would violate the Fourth Amendment.124 The 
Ninth Circuit’s reading of Flores-Montano puts this idea into 
question, as any search of property at the border would now 
seem to be justified without the need for further justification.  It 
bears mentioning that, given the huge intrusion resulting from 
computer searches, one would think that the balance would tip 
so as to require some level of justification.  This proposition has 
 
Court's reasoning in Flores-Montano, this Court cannot equate the search of a computer 
with the search of a person.  The Court finds that the search of a computer is more 
analogous to the search of a vehicle and/or its contents.”). 
 119 See id. at 945; see also United States v. Lawson, 461 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“An x-ray examination of a person, it is true, may require some level of suspicion . . . 
because it may permit greater intrusions into the privacy and dignity of the individual [, 
b]ut ‘the same is not true about x-rays of objects.’”) (quoting United States v. Okafor, 285 
F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2002)) (citations omitted); United States v. Hernandez, 424 F.3d 
1056, 1057 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005) (“As we explain, this routine/non-routine analytical 
framework has been denounced by the Supreme Court insofar as searches of property 
are concerned.”); United States v. Camacho, 368 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The 
Supreme Court has now disapproved Molina-Tarazon.”). 
 120 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, POLICY REGARDING BORDER SEARCH OF 
INFORMATION (July 16, 2008), 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissibility/search_authority.ctt/search_aut
hority.pdf. 
 121 Id. 
 122 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
 123 Id. at 623-24, 624 n.18. 
 124 See id. at 624. 
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been supported by some lower courts which have indicated that 
it is one thing to allow for a perusal of a document to verify that 
it contains no contraband but another thing entirely to read a 
document, such as a diary, which could deal with very personal 
matters.125 
Lower courts have expanded on what is appropriate under 
Ramsey.  In United States v. Seljan,126 border inspectors as part 
of a currency interdiction program opened a FedEx box and 
discovered a letter.  They quickly scanned the letter and saw 
indication of pedophilic activity.  The defendant argued that to 
actually read the letter required some justification.  The court 
found scanning (reading a few words) to be reasonable even 
without justification.  Raising the issue of terrorism, the court 
said that there should not be “unreasonable constraints” on 
custom officials examining documents, as such constraints could 
result in overlooking detection plans for explosive devices, 
instructions for an attack, chemical formulas for poison, or other 
types of information related to terrorism.127  In the en banc 
decision, Chief Judge Kozinski in his dissent points out that the 
founders had great concern for protecting “the privacy of 
thoughts and ideas.”  This is clearly indicated by the inclusion of 
the term “papers” in the actual text of the Fourth Amendment.  
Kozinski further points out that giving custom official free reign 
to search unless they destroy property or invade the body is 
 
 125 See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).  
For photocopying or closely reading documents, usually reasonable suspicion is required. 
See United States v. Schoor, 597 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1979); Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 
2d at 191. 
 126 497 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d en banc No. 05-50236, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22056 (Oct. 23, 2008). 
 127 United States v. Seljan, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 22056, at *29 n.9 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc).  In the en banc decision, Judge Callahan concurrence stated, “‘[p]articularly in 
today’s world, national security interests may require uncovering terrorist 
communications, which are inherently expressive.’” Id. at *48 (Callahan, J. concurring) 
(quoting United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005)).  Judge Callahan 
concurring also points out that Congress pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1583 restricts custom 
inspectors from searching international mail weighing sixteen ounces or less sent via the 
U.S. Postal Service.  A person could therefore avoid the reading of the contents of her 
correspondence if she sent it via U.S. Postal Service as opposed to Federal Express.  Id. 
at *55-56. 
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simply too much leeway.128  Despite Kozinki’s eloquence, the 
Ninth Circuit’s reading of Flores-Montano would seem to allow 
for the reading of a laptop’s contents without further 
justification.129 
It should be reiterated that the only exception with regard 
to property searches mentioned in Flores-Montano was the 
possibility that some inanimate object searches would become 
non-routine when they involved the destruction of property.  
Destruction of property and the reusability of the car appeared 
to be important factors.  The Court in Flores-Montano 
commented in a footnote that they had no reason to consider 
drilling, as the case involved removal, disassembly, and 
reassembly.130 In a Ninth Circuit case after Flores, the situation 
involved the cutting open of a spare tire.  The court found that 
this was not unreasonably destructive, as the vehicle could still 
be operated safely.131 
II. TERRORISM AND THE BORDER 
In the government briefs for Flores-Montano, the issue of 
terrorism was raised.  The United States pointed out that gas 
tanks could not only be used to smuggle narcotics but also be 
used as instruments of terror.132  To emphasize this point, the 
Government referenced the case of Ahmed Ressam, a would-be 
terrorist who had explosives hidden in the trunk of his vehicle 
which were to be detonated at Los Angeles International 
Airport.133  The Government argued that if a trunk can be 
searched without reasonable suspicion but a gas tank cannot be, 
 
 128 Id. at *57-72 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 129 These cases raise many concerns especially when considering laptop searches at 
the border.  Apparently, the Department of Homeland Security is routinely searching 
laptops as American reenter the United States from abroad. With the discretion allotted 
to border patrol agents, it is not surprising that selective ethnic groups could be targeted 
for more extensive searches. See Austin Bogues, Laptop Searches in Airports Draw Fire 
at Senate Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008, at A17. 
 130 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2 (2004). 
 131 See United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 383 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 132 Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 
(2004) (No. 02-1794), 2003 WL 22873083. 
 133 United States v. Ressam, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Wash. 2002). 
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it will encourage terrorists to hide materials in the gas tank.134  
A brief by the Washington Legal Foundation, a public interest 
law center with its objective of promoting national security, also 
strongly argued for suspicionless searches as an important 
means to prevent terrorist attacks.  Thus, the Court was 
certainly made aware of the terrorist threat.135 
In overturning United States v. Molina-Tarazon,136 which 
required reasonable suspicion for a fuel tank search, the Court 
may have been considering the terrorist threats when it said 
“[t]he Government’s interest in preventing the entry of 
unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the 
international border.”137 The concern over terrorists at the 
border can also be found in the circuits.  The Third Circuit 
states: “[I]t is beyond peradventure, as the Seventh Circuit has 
noted, that ‘the events of September 11, 2001, only emphasize 
the heightened need to conduct searches’ at our borders.”138 
Terrorism objectives fall comfortably into the category of 
cases involving so-called “special needs” searches.139 The 
Government made an unsuccessful argument of special needs in 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.140  In Edmond, a traffic 
checkpoint program, using roadblocks, designed to interdict 
illegal narcotics was held to violate the Fourth Amendment 
because its primary purpose was to detect crime.141  However, 
once it is established that there are needs beyond normal law 
enforcement, balancing to determine reasonableness kicks in.  In 
conducting this balance, courts consider the government 
interest, including the weight and immediacy of the government 
objective, as well as whether the search will accomplish this 
 
 134 Brief for the United States, supra note 132, at 18. 
 135 See Brief of Wash. Legal Found. & Allied Educ. Found. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004) (No. 02-
1794), 2003 WL 22873084. 
 136 279 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 137 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
 138 United States v. Bradley, 299 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States 
v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 139 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
 140 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000). 
 141 Id. 
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objective.  The nature and character of the intrusion is weighted 
against this government interest.  It is interesting to note that 
the Edmond court in dicta indicated that a roadblock could be 
employed without a warrant or reasonable suspicion to “thwart 
an imminent terrorist attack.”142 
A case involving a search in the New York subway to 
address terrorism concerns presents a useful illustration of this 
balancing, as well as a special needs search. 143  The court 
indicated that terrorism was indeed a special need.144 Moreover, 
the court felt it was not necessary to demonstrate any specific 
impending threat and instead talked about the objective of 
preventing a pervasive threat from spreading.145  Further, in 
light of the fact that there were thwarted plots in the New York 
subway as well as recent bombings in Madrid, London, and 
Moscow, the threat was imminent and the risk high.  Although 
the court recognized the Fourth Amendment protects an 
individual’s right in the contents of packages brought into 
subways, it felt the intrusion was not great: passengers received 
notice of the search and could decline the search as long as they 
left the subway, and the search was limited only to containers 
that could contain explosives and to only a visual inspection 
unless it was necessary to manipulate.146  Further, the officers 
would not read printed or written material or request any 
personal bodily inspection.147  The search itself only lasted a 
matter of seconds, and there was no danger of the arbitrary use 
of power and no discretion exercised by the police because they 
stopped everyone.148  With regard to the effectiveness of the 
search, the court gave great deference to law enforcement 
officials who had “‘a unique understanding of, and responsibility 
 
 142 Id. at 44. 
 143 See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 144 See id. at 263. 
 145 See id. at 272.  See also Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) 
(employing the same approach and speaking of a general threat resulting from a 
pervasive drug problem among our nation’s youth as sufficient immediacy). 
 146 MacWade, 460 F.3d at 273. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
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for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police 
officers.’”149 Therefore, the court did not inquire greatly into the 
effectiveness, instead opting to determine if it was reasonably 
effective to accomplish the government objective of deterring 
and detecting a terrorist attack on the subway system.150  The 
fact that searches were done at random subway stations did not 
alter its effectiveness because expert testimony indicated that 
terrorists want predictable and vulnerable targets and the 
random nature of the program generated uncertainty, which 
deters attacks.151 
The case of Tabbaa v. Chertoff152 deals squarely with issues 
of terrorism at the border and probably describes the present 
state of Fourth Amendment doctrine at the border.  The case 
was a civil action in which the plaintiffs claimed, among other 
things, that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by 
the border patrol.153  Based on intelligence, the U.S. Bureau of 
Customs and Border Patrol planned an inspection operation to 
carefully screen individuals who attended the Reviving the 
Islamic Spirit (RIS) Conference at the Sky Dome in Toronto, 
Canada.154  It should be noted that an estimated 13,000 people 
from across North America attended the RIS Conference.155  The 
intelligence indicated that persons with terrorist ties as well as 
known terrorists would be attending the conference.156  
Everyone who attended, upon their re-crossing the border, was 
subject to a screening procedure which permitted border officials 
 
 149 Id. (quoting Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990)). 
 150 Id. at 273-75. 
 151 It should be pointed out that even though the justification for these searches is to 
protect our national security against the threat of terrorism and not to obtain evidence to 
use in criminal prosecutions, the evidence resulting from such searches is often used in 
ordinary (non-terrorist) criminal prosecutions. See Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, The 
Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential 
Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amendment, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 147, 193 
(2006). 
 152 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 153 Id. at 91. 
 154 Id. at 93-94. 
 155 Id. at 94. 
 156 Id. at 93. 
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to fingerprint and photograph them.157  Plaintiffs, who had 
attended the conference for religious reasons, had no criminal 
records and there was no evidence they had committed a crime 
or were associated with terrorists.158  Nevertheless, plaintiffs, 
after they had affirmatively indicated they had been to the 
conference, were ordered to pull their cars into a separate area 
and enter a nearby building.159  While their cars were searched, 
the plaintiffs were frisked, questioned, fingerprinted, and 
photographed.  Each of the plaintiffs was “detained and 
searched for between four and six hours.”160 The frisk involved 
CBP officers forcefully kicking the plaintiffs’ feet open and 
almost knocking them to the ground in order to effectuate the 
search.161 Plaintiffs were not, however, subject to strip, body 
cavity or involuntary x-ray searches.162 
The issue before the court in Tabaa was whether the 
detention and search was so invasive as to be beyond a routine 
border search.  The Second Circuit was asked to determine the 
precise line between what is routine and what is not routine.163  
The court has held that “[r]outine searches include those 
searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or 
shoes which, unlike strip searches, do not substantially infringe 
 
 157 Id. at 93-94. 
In response to this intelligence information, CBP prepared an Intelligence 
Driven Special Operation ("IDSO"). An IDSO is a directive to particular ports 
of entry to undertake special enforcement actions to meet specific concerns 
raised by intelligence information. Under the IDSO in this case, the Buffalo 
port of entry, among others, was instructed to identify and examine persons 
associated with the RIS conference or other similar conferences taking place in 
Toronto who sought entry to the United States. The Buffalo port was directed 
to contact the National Targeting Center ("NTC") of CBP if persons identified 
in the IDSO were encountered in order to determine whether the individuals 
posed a particular threat. 
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, No. 05-CV-582S, 2005 WL 3531828, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005) 
(citations omitted). 
 158 Tabbaa, 509 F.3d at 94. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 95. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 98-99. 
 163 See generally Unites States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006). 
03_BLOOM 12/27/2008  9:03:19 PM 
322 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78.2 
on a traveler’s privacy rights.”164  More invasive searches, like 
“strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches” are not 
routine and require reasonable suspicion level of justification.165 
The spectrum between a full body cavity search and the time of 
detention in Montoya de Hernandez and quick searches at the 
border of clothing and luggage usually accomplished in a short 
time is great.  The question the court faced in this case was: 
Where does this terrorist-style processing fall within the 
spectrum? 
Plaintiffs argued the search was not routine.166  First, 
plaintiffs alleged that being selected for intrusive questioning, 
photographing and fingerprinting in a separate building with 
other Muslims created a stigma, whereas searches of cars or 
luggage to which everyone is subject does not create such a 
stigma.167  They further argued that CBP threatened to detain 
them until they cooperated, and finally argued that a time of 
detention of four to six hours should not be considered routine.168  
The court analyzed each aspect of the procedure taken by the 
CBP and concluded that none of the factors were non-routine.169 
Even the kicking of the feet was not as invasive as lifting a shirt. 
The court did, however, recognize that the cumulative effect 
of several routine searches could reach the level of non-routine, 
but did not find such a cumulative effect in this case.170  
Stigmatization did not reach the level of a body cavity or strip 
 
 164 Id. (citing United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
 165 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985). 
 166 Tabbaa, 509 F.3d at 97-101. 
 167 Id. at 98-99. 
 168 Id. at 99-101. 
 169 Id. at 101.  See United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that 
questions about citizenship, the length and purpose of  an applicant’s trip to Canada, 
and what items she had acquired or bought in Canada are all routine). Likewise, pat-
down searches have repeatedly been found to be routine, even when they were followed 
by the lifting of an applicant’s shirt or forced removal of shoes. See, e.g., United States v. 
Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting “the light touching of appellant’s back 
followed by a lifting of his shirt arguably straddles the line between the two categories of 
border searches,” it can be considered a routine search because the “potential indignity . . 
. failed to compare with the much greater level of intrusion associated with a body or full 
strip search.”). 
 170 Tabbaa, 509 F.3d at 99. 
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search or involuntary X-ray as in Montoya de Hernandez. 
“Because the decisive factor in the analysis is invasiveness of 
privacy—not overall inconvenience . . . searches of plaintiffs, 
considered in their entirety, were routine in the border context, 
albeit near the outer limits of what is permissible absent 
reasonable suspicion.”171 
With regard to the threatening behavior, the court cited 
Ramsey for the proposition that threatening extended detention 
for failing to comply with screening measures is “an important 
aspect of the ‘longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself’ 
at the border, and therefore is ‘reasonable simply by virtue of 
the fact that [it] occur[s] at the border.’”172  “In other words,  
border crossers cannot, by their own non-compliance, turn an 
otherwise routine search into a non-routine [search].”173 
The four to six hour time of detention falls somewhere 
between the sixteen hours in Montoya de Hernandez and the 
one-hour delay in Flores-Montano.174 The court asked itself 
whether the detention was reasonably related to the justification 
for it.175 Although the court recognized the inconvenience of the 
four to six hour detention, it suggested that such a time-frame, 
by itself, would not render the search non-routine especially in 
the border context.176 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has shown a willingness to defer to the executive 
branch.  After Hamdan indicated that a specific Congressional 
enactment was required,177 Congress acted accordingly.  The 
 
 171 Id. 
 172 See id. at 100 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) 
(alterations in original)). 
 173 See id. 
 174 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n.3 (2004) (“Respondent 
points to no cases indicating the Fourth Amendment shields entrants from 
inconvenience or delay at the international border.”). 
 175 See Tabbaa, 509 F.3d at 100 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 
473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985)); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682-85 (1985). 
 176 See Tabbaa, 509 F.3d at 100-01. 
 177 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
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Court overturned the act, in part, in Boumediene.178  Recently 
Congress has once again shown deference to the executive 
branch by allowing for expansion of its surveillance power, 
including immunity for phone companies that cooperated with 
the National Security Agency.179 The Court appears to be the 
only branch of government that will review the executive power 
in accordance with the checks and balances envisioned by our 
founding ancestors.  One is reminded of Justice O’Connor’s 
words in Hamdi, in which she warned that “a state of war is not 
a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of 
the Nation’s citizens.”180 
Will the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment 
take into account terrorism concerns? 181 The Supreme Court has 
only specifically addressed the Fourth Amendment and its 
relation to national security issues such as terrorism in 1972.  In 
United States v. United States District Court (Keith),182 the 
Court sought to address executive branch surveillance in a 
national security context.  In Keith, electronic wiretaps were 
used against U.S. citizens who were suspected of conspiracy to 
bomb U.S. government property.183  These wiretaps were 
authorized by the U.S. Attorney General but without any court 
authorization.184  Justice Powell for the unanimous Court 
balanced the government interest to protect national security 
against the invasion on individual privacy.185  While the Court 
was prepared to accept some different Fourth Amendment rules 
in this context, it emphasized that some Fourth Amendment 
 
 178 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).  See supra note 18 and accompanying 
text. 
 179 See Eric Lichtblau, Senate Approves Bill to Broaden Wiretap Powers, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 10, 2008, at A1. 
 180 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2006). 
 181 See John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 765, 810-11 (2006) (“[F]or reasonableness to work in the interpretation of the 
right that limits police authority to search and seize, courts must put a thumb on the 
government’s side of the scale when they craft doctrine.”). 
 182 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 183 Id. at 299-300. 
 184 Id. at 299. 
 185 Id. at 314-21. 
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safeguards were still necessary (e.g., warrants).186 
Is there a greater acceptance by the Court of police power 
since 9/11? To the extent that the Court has discussed this, it 
has indicated a greater sensitivity to police methods.  In United 
States v. Drayton,187 the Court pointed out greater cooperation in 
the age of terrorism between citizens and the police: “[B]us 
passengers answer officers’ questions and otherwise cooperate 
not because of coercion but because the passengers know that 
their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of 
those around them.”188 As previously mentioned, City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmonds,189 a case involving a traffic checkpoint 
program designed to interdict illegal narcotics, was held to 
violate the Fourth Amendment because its primary purpose was 
to detect crime.  Nonetheless, the Court in dicta mused that a 
suspicionless roadblock would be permissible if employed to 
“thwart an imminent terrorist attack.”190 
This article has analyzed the likely outcomes of the law and 
the flexibility with which the Fourth Amendment can be 
manipulated to accomplish the objectives of limiting individual 
rights at the border.  The reasonableness approach to the Fourth 
Amendment, with its balancing analysis, supplies the method 
for the Court to consider terrorism.  Justice Brennan, dissenting 
in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,191 described this balancing as 
“Rohrschach-like” and characterized the Court’s reasoning as 
“preordained.”192 With the flexibility inherent in such balancing, 
one is reminded of the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter: “It is 
true also of journeys in the law that the place you reach depends 
 
 186 For a comprehensive discussion of Keith, the executive’s use of warrantless NSA 
surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, see Bloom & Dunn, supra note 151. In 
response to Keith and President Nixon’s abuse of power during the Watergate scandal, 
Congress conducted an extensive inquiry into the activities of the nation’s intelligence 
agencies (the Church Committee hearings).  The result of these hearings was the 
passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. See id. at 155-56. 
 187 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 188 Id. at 205. 
 189 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 190 Id. at 44. 
 191 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 192 Id. at 358. 
03_BLOOM 12/27/2008  9:03:19 PM 
326 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78.2 
on the direction you are taking.  And so, where one comes out on 
a case depends on where one goes in.”193 
To the extent that the American public has been polled 
since 9/11, there is generally support for greater security 
measures even if these measures infringe on individual 
privacy.194 Will the reasonable balancing allowed by the Fourth 
Amendment provide for the insinuation of popular sentiment 
into court decisions?  The courts have always provided a 
safeguard for constitutional protection.  The protection remains 
regardless of public outcry.  The Constitution was designed to 
protect law abiders and law breakers.  The words of Chief 
Justice Tauro of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in 
declaring that the death penalty was unconstitutional under the 
Massachusetts Constitution, come to mind: 
[J]udges cannot look to public opinion polls or election results 
for constitutional meaning as has been suggested.  It is our 
duty to interpret the Constitution to the best of our personal 
abilities and judgment.  Our constitution requires that we be 
‘as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will 
admit.’ If we succumb to contemporary public opinion we lose 
that requisite independence and impartiality demanded of us 
and fail totally in our purpose.195 
Terrorism has changed the landscape.  Given the enormous 
dangers to life and property from terrorist acts, it has increased 
the government’s interest exponentially.196 In analyzing 
terrorism, we are forced to make accommodations.  As Justice 
Scalia wrote in Anderson v. Creighton, “regardless of the 
terminology used, the precise content of most of the 
Constitution’s civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an 
assessment of what accommodation between governmental need 
and individual freedom is reasonable.”197  This is also true in our 
 
 193 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 194 See Robert C. Power, Changing Expectations of Privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment, 16 WIDENER L.J. 43, 44 (2006). 
 195 Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 692 (Mass. 1975) (quoting 
MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 29). 
 196 See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 197 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987). 
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Fourth Amendment analysis of reasonableness. 
Nevertheless, I am reminded of Justice Potter Stewart’s 
words.  Justice Stewart, in 1971, referencing the Fourth 
Amendment, observed: 
[T]his basic law and the values that it represents may appear 
unrealistic or ‘extravagant’ to some.  But the values were those 
of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts.  In 
times not altogether unlike our own they won . . . a right of 
personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official power.  
If times have changed, . . . the changes have made the values 
served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.198 
The balancing of individual rights with security concerns 
was addressed by Israel’s Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
Aharon Barak in 2004, when he ordered the removal of a portion 
of the West Bank Security Wall due to its burden on the 
Palestinians: 
We are aware that in the short term, this judgment will not 
make the state’s struggle against those rising up against it any 
easier . . . This is the destiny of a democracy: she does not see 
all means as acceptable, and the ways of her enemies are not 
always open before her.  A democracy must sometimes fight 
with one arm tied behind her back.  Even so, democracy has 
the upper hand.  The rule of law and individual liberties 
constitute an important aspect of her security stance.199 
If the war on terrorism is fought in a way that ignores our 
democratic ideals, we have lost the war. 
 
 198 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (footnote omitted). 
 199 Gareth Evans, President, Int’l Crisis Group, 2005 Wallace Wurth Lecture at the 
University of New South Wales, Sydney: The Global Response to Terrorism 10 (Sept. 27, 
2005) (alteration in original) (transcript available at 
http://www.unsw.edu.au/news/pad/articles/2005/sep/FINALWurthLectureTerrorismGE.p
df); see also Michael S. Greco, President’s Message, A False Choice: The American People 
Should Not Be Forced to Choose Between Freedom and Security, A.B.A. J., April 2006, at 
6, 6 (“The [P]resident has a sacred obligation under the Constitution to protect both the 
nation’s safety and its constitutionally-guaranteed freedoms–and to honor the doctrine of 
separation of powers. His failure to do so would compromise the very principles and 
ideals that we are fighting to protect.”). 
